manent. But to say so is to indulge in abstractions. Every form of reality, high or low, presents both a subjective and objective side, and when one of them changes, the other does the same. For instance, the piece of paper before me, a very small and apparently negligible part of reality, presents both these sides and would be impossible without anyone of them. It is an object of knowledge and thus necessarily implies me as its knower. But it may seem that though. I am necessary for it, it is not necessary for me. Really however, *I as its knowev*—that much of me which consists in being its knower, would be impossible without it. And when every aspect of my nature consisting in being the knower of particular objects is abstracted from me, I am really reduced to nothing. In the same manner every change in the object before me represents a change in me. If the paper is torn, if it changes colour, or is burnt, these changes represent changes in my mental life. They are as much objects of my knowledge as the paper when unchanged. A mere subject without objects, a merely unchanged reality not related to change,—the idol of Mayavada or Subjective Idealism, is therefore, an abstraction. It will be seen in the same manner that an Infinite unrelated to the finite, a "Universal without relation to particulars or individuals,—the idol of the Absolute Monist,—is also an abstraction. Our Philosopher Indra, seems to see this truth also, though he is not fully explicit on

this point. He says one should know the Absolute thus—" He is my self ". "What reality is represented by ″ my" ? It is the finite individual, the subject of growing knowledge and of instructions and injunctions like " One should know " and " One should act so ". It is created by the Absolute's eternal activity of self-distinction—this process of distinguishing himself from his creations and yet integrating the latter wit^ him,—a process unintelligible to the mere analytic "understanding but not so to the synthesising Reason. If the Absolute were alone, without necessary relation to finite selves, the ethical and spiritual world which consists of *persons* related to one another would be impossible *even for a single moment.* A solitary Absolute could not imagine himself for a moment without self-contradiction as distinct from objects in time and space and distinct from persons other than himself. The presence of the objective world and of finite intelligences knowing the Infinite is therefore a conclusive evidence of the truth that the Absolute is not *ekamevadwitiam* in the monistic sense, but that he is necessarily related to finite objects and persons,

All this is implied in the philosophy of Indra which we have taken pains to interpret ".

Chapter IV seems to be supplementary to the third.